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WHY THE NORTH DAKOTA PUBLICLY TRADED
CORPORATIONS ACT WILL FAIL
STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE*

Most commentators believe that states compete in granting corporate
charters. After all, the more charters (certificates of incorporation) the state
grants, the more franchise and other taxes it collects. This competition can
take a number of forms. The state can offer such inducements as attractive
tax treatment, a dedicated business law court, and statutes whose terms are
attractive to the relevant decision maker.
Delaware is the runaway winner in this competition. More than half of
the corporations listed for trading on the New York Stock Exchange and
nearly sixty percent of the Fortune 500 corporations are incorporated in
Delaware.1
Those who believe that state competition results in a “race to the
bottom” believe that Delaware’s corporate statute is skewed to favor the
interests of corporate managers rather than those of investors. As the story
goes, because it is corporate managers who decide on the state of incorporation, Delaware caters to management, allowing them to exploit shareholders.2
An alternative view claims that state competition leads to a race to the
3
top. According to this account, investors will not purchase, or at least not
pay as much for, securities of firms incorporated in states that cater
excessively to management. Likewise, lenders will not lend to such firms
without compensation for the risks posed by management’s lack of accountability. As a result, those firms’ cost of capital will rise, while their
earnings will fall. Among other things, such firms thereby become more
vulnerable to a hostile takeover and subsequent management purges.
Corporate managers therefore have strong incentives to incorporate the
*
William D. Warren Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law. I thank William Chandler and
William Klein for their thoughtful comments. All remaining errors are my fault.
1. STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 16 (2002).
2. See generally William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon
Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 663 (1974) (providing a classic statement of the “race to the
bottom” hypothesis).
3. See Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the
Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 254-58 (1977) (offering the seminal response to Cary).
There is a third view, which is that most states do not compete for chartering revenues, leaving the
field to Delaware. See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, Does Delaware Compete? (Dec. 12, 2008), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1315342.
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business in a state offering rules preferred by investors and, as a result,
competition for corporate charters should lead to statutes that maximize
shareholder wealth.
Although the empirical evidence is highly contested, there are good
reasons to believe that the race is to the top rather than the bottom. Roberta
Romano’s event study of corporations’ changing their domicile by reincorporating in Delaware, for example, found that such firms experienced statistically significant positive cumulative abnormal returns.4 In other words,
reincorporating in Delaware increased shareholder wealth. This finding
strongly supports the race to the top hypothesis. If shareholders thought
that Delaware was winning a race to the bottom, shareholders should dump
the stock of firms that reincorporate in Delaware, driving down the stock
price of such firms. As Romano found, and all of the other major event
studies confirm, there is a positive stock price effect upon reincorporation
in Delaware.5
The event study findings are buttressed by a well-known study by
Robert Daines in which he compared the Tobin’s Q of Delaware and nonDelaware corporations.6 Daines found that Delaware corporations in the
period 1981-1996 had a higher Tobin’s Q than those of non-Delaware corporations, suggesting that Delaware law increases shareholder wealth.7
Although subsequent research suggests that this effect may not hold for all
periods, Daines’ study remains an important confirmation of the event study
data.
Additional support for the event study findings is provided by takeover
regulation. Compared to most states, which have adopted multiple antitakeover statutes of ever-increasing ferocity, Delaware’s single takeover statute
is relatively friendly to hostile bidders. An empirical study of state corporation codes by John Coates confirms that the Delaware statute is the least
restrictive and imposes the least delay on a hostile bidder.8 Given the clear
evidence that hostile takeovers increase shareholder wealth,9 this finding is

4. Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J. L.
ECON. & ORG. 225, passim (1985).
5. See generally ROBERTA ROMANO, THE ADVANTAGE OF COMPETITIVE FEDERALISM FOR
SECURITIES REGULATION 64-73 (2002) (discussing the relevant studies and criticisms thereof).
6. Tobin’s Q is the ratio of a firm’s market value to its book value and is a widely accepted
measure of firm value.
7. Robert Daines, Does Delaware Law Improve Firm Value?, 62 J. FIN. ECON. 525, 525
(2001).
8. John C. Coates IV, An Index of the Contestability of Corporate Control: Studying
Variation in Takeover Vulnerability (June 1999) (working paper, on file with the author).
9. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 1, at 612-14.
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especially striking. Delaware thus turns out to be quite takeover-friendly
and, by implication, shareholder-friendly.
In 2007, North Dakota threw down the gauntlet to Delaware by
adopting the Publicly Traded Corporations Act, which “is designed to
strengthen corporate democracy and improve the performance of publicly
traded corporations.”10 It is specifically designed to give shareholders
greater rights and to reflect “the best thinking of institutional investors and
governance experts.”11 The idea, presumably, is that North Dakota will
attract incorporations away from Delaware by being more shareholderfriendly than Delaware.
I am confident in predicting that the North Dakota experiment will fail.
First, the Act does nothing to address Delaware’s other advantages. There
is a considerable body of case law interpreting the Delaware corporate
statute (DGCL), which allows legal questions to be answered with confidence. Delaware has a separate court, the Court of Chancery, devoted
largely to corporate law cases. The Chancellors have great expertise in
corporate law matters, making their court a highly sophisticated forum for
resolving disputes. They also tend to render decisions quite quickly; facilitating transactions that are often sensitive.12 At least in the near term, North
Dakota cannot replicate these advantages.
Second, turning to the statutes, North Dakota inevitably loses whether
state competition is a race to the top or to the bottom. If state competition is
a race to the bottom, which Delaware wins by catering to management
interests at the expense of shareholders, the managers who control the
incorporation decision will continue to choose Delaware. Incorporation in
North Dakota would limit managers’ ability to extract private rents, so they
have no incentive to do so.
If state competition is a race to the top, the position I believe both
theory and the empirical evidence supports, North Dakota will still lose.
Corporate law in almost all states places sharp limits on shareholder

10. NORTH DAKOTA CORPORATE GOVERNANCE COUNCIL, EXPLANATION OF THE NORTH
DAKOTA PUBLICLY TRADED CORPORATIONS ACT 1 (2007), http://ndcgc.org/Reference/Explain
405.pdf. The Act also offers a franchise tax rate fifty percent of that imposed on public corporations by Delaware. Id.
11. North Dakota Corporate Governance Council Homepage, http://ndcgc.org/ (last visited
Mar. 27, 2009).
12. Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the Competition for Corporate
Charters, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1061, 1077 (2000).
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involvement in corporate decision-making.13 Taken together, these myriad
rules form a regime I have called “director primacy.”14
The director primacy account of corporate governance begins with the
observation that the size and complexity of the public corporation ensures
that stakeholders face significant collective action problems in making decisions, suffer from intractable information asymmetries, and have differing
interests.15 Under such conditions, consensus-based decision-making structures are likely to fail. Instead, it is cheaper and more convenient to assign
the decision-making function to a central decision maker wielding the
power to rewrite intra-corporate contracts by fiat.
The analysis to this point, of course, suggests only that the decisionmaking structure should be one based on authority rather than participatory
democracy. Yet, it turns out that corporate law also was wise to assign
ultimate decision-making authority to a group—i.e., the board of directors—rather than a single individual. Groups have significant advantages
vis-à-vis individuals at exercising critical evaluative judgment, which is
precisely the skill set principally needed at the top of the corporate
hierarchy. In addition, groups solve the problem of “who watches the
watchers” by placing a self-monitoring body at the apex of the corporate
hierarchy. The chief economic virtue of the public corporation thus is that
it provides a hierarchical decision-making structure well suited to the
problem of operating a large business enterprise with numerous employees,
managers, shareholders, creditors, and other inputs. In turn, it is the separation of ownership and control that makes this structure viable.
While it is true that “Delaware has not explicitly embraced director
primacy, the relevant statutory provisions and the [case law] have largely
intimated that directors retain authority and need not passively allow either
exogenous events or shareholder action to determine corporate decisionmaking.”16 In contrast, North Dakota’s statute displaces this efficient and
long-established system of director primacy in favor of shareholder
primacy. Yet, if the race to the top account is to be believed, shareholders
prefer director primacy to shareholder primacy.

13. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 1, at 512-14 (discussing “a host of other rules that indirectly
prevent shareholders from exercising significant influence over corporate decision-making”).
14. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate
Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, passim 547 (2003) (setting out director primacy model).
15. STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE 23-104 (2008).
16. Harry G. Hutchison, Director Primacy and Corporate Governance: Shareholder Voting
Rights Captured by the Accountability/Authority Paradigm, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1111, 1194
(2005).
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Pointing out that the “mechanism by which stocks are valued ensures
that the price reflects the terms of governance and operation,” 17 Frank
Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel posit a logical negative inference to be
drawn from the race to the top account:
Although agency costs are high, many managerial teams are
scrupulously dedicated to investors’ interests. . . . By increasing
the value of the firm, they would do themselves a favor (most
managers’ compensation is linked to the stock market, and they
own stock too). Nonexistence of securities said to be beneficial to
investors is telling.18
By the same token, if investors valued the rights North Dakota confers
upon them, we would expect to observe entrepreneurs taking a company
public to offer such rights either through appropriate provisions in the
firm’s organic documents—which has always been possible in Delaware—
or by lobbying the Delaware Legislature to provide such rights off the rack
in the corporation code. Because we observe neither, we may conclude
investors do not value these rights.19
In sum, if investors valued the provisions of the North Dakota Act,
Delaware would have gotten there first. When the North Dakota shareholder primacy statute fails in the market for corporate charters, we will
have one more piece of evidence that investors prefer director primacy.

17. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 18 (1991).
18. Id. at 205.
19. Note that my argument differs from The Economist’s observation that, if the North
Dakota statute is successful, “Delaware is highly likely to respond with reforms of its own.
Experience suggests that Delaware understands very well the cost of losing its edge in this lucrative business.” Anywhere but Delaware, THE ECON., April 17, 2007, available at http://www.
economist.com/business/displaystory.cfm?story_id=E1_JDNRQNG. My point is that, if the provisions of the North Dakota statute were preferred by investors, Delaware would have already
adopted them. If I am wrong and The Economist is right, moreover, the North Dakota statute will
still fail to prevail in the market for corporate charters.

